Land Tenure and Conveyances in Missouri by Hudson, Manley O.
University of Missouri Bulletin Law Series 
Volume 8 June 1915 Article 3 
1915 
Land Tenure and Conveyances in Missouri 
Manley O. Hudson 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/ls 
 Part of the Property Law and Real Estate Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Manley O. Hudson, Land Tenure and Conveyances in Missouri, 8 Bulletin Law Series. (1915) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/ls/vol8/iss1/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of Law 
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Missouri Bulletin Law Series by an 
authorized editor of University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please 
contact bassettcw@missouri.edu. 
Land Tenure and Conveyances in Missouri
I INTRODUCTION
It is impossible to apply the artificial rules of the modern
law of real property without a clear understanding of the
feudal system of land tenure in which they originated. The
disappearance of the essentials of feudal society-the personal
relation between lord and tenant and the duties owed by the
tenant to the lord-has not taken away the feudal basis of
the law of real property; nor has it made the common law
rules, apart from statute, less applicable. 1 But there is such
a close connection between land ownership and other social
institutions' that, however fixed the legal theory, the former
is bound to undergo many changes as the latter are developed.
To know what these changes have been and are to be, it is
imperative that the fundamental conceptions of land ownership
be understood. No study of future interests in land can neglect
the basic notions of tenure and seisin, both of which are still
of influence in the development of the law.
At the outset in studying the law of real property in
Missouri, therefore, one is confronted with the questions-
how is land in Missouri owned? Is it the absolute property of
the holder of the fee simple? Or is it merely held by him
under the paramount lordship of the state? Is thefeudal
conception of land tenure so out of harmony with present social
thinking3 that it has no place in our legal theory? And these
1. The following dictum of Judge Bliss is interesting only for its
rhetoric: "The practical sense of modern jurisprudence has so sifted that
vast pile of wisdom and rubbish, comprising the common law of tenures,
that justice and reason are no longer the slaves of technical consistency."
Aubuchon v. Bender (1869) 44 Mo. 560,'568.
FA 2. "The progress of nations has been reflected, step by step, in the
development of customs and laws relating to the tenure of landed
property." Munro, Seignorial System in Canada, p. 1.
3. It may be~pointed out in this connection that there appears to
be a close parallel between the feudal conception of the crown or state as
ultimate owner-the overlord-of all land, and modern state socialism.
1 Sybel, Geschichte der Revolutionszeit, p. 33; Kovalevsky, Modern
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are in turn to be followed by the questions-of what importance
is seisin in Missouri today? May land still be conveyed by
livery of seisin? In what manner does a modern conveyance
operate to pass the title to land?
It is believed that the answers to these questions have
something more than academic interest, that they may have
a very controlling influence in the solution of practical problems
which frequently arise in the construction of deeds and wills.
II LAND TENURE IN MISSOURI
At common law, all land in England was held either
mediately or immediately of the crown.4 No person could
own land outright; ownership of land was a royal prerogative.
The feudal regime which necessitated this system of land
tenure had to be supported in its incipiency by military power,
and in its earliest stages the services owed by the tenant to his
lord were military in nature. The military tenure by knight
service was distinguished from the later socage tenure in which
only agricultural services were owed. The chief characteristic
of socage tenure, however, was that the services owed by the
tenant were certain and fixed; and as time went on all tenures of
land by certain and invariable rents and service, tho not agri-
cultural, came to be regarded as socage tenures. In 1660,
military tenure was abolished in England and all freehold
tenure became socage. 5 Today most of the land in England is
held in socage tenure.
6
In the American colonies, under British dominion, all land
was held in socage tenure.7 The effect of the Revolution
Customs and Ancient Laws of Russia, p. 113. Cf. Laveleye, Primitive
Property, c. 22; 1 Ely, Property and Contract, p. 124, et seq.
4. Williams, Real Property (17th Int. ed.) p. 7.
5. 12 Car. II, c. 24. This statute did not apply to copyholds which
still exist in England. Tiffany, Real Property, § 13.
6. Jenks, Short History of English Law, p. 237.
7. "All the country now possessed by the United States was a part
of the dominions appertaining to the crown of Great Britain. Every
acre of land in this country was then held mediately or immediately by
grants from that crown." Jay, C. J., in Chisholm v. Georgia (1792)
2 Dallas 419, 470. See also Van Rensselaer v. Hays (1859) 19 N. Y. 68,
73; Story, Constitution of the United States (3d ed.) §§ 172-175. For
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must have been to substitute the respective states for the
crown as the overlord in this system of tenure, for "it does not
seem that so fundamental an alteration in the theory of prop-
erty as the abolition of tenure would be worked by a change of
political sovereignty." 8  In several of the original states, all
lands have since been made allodial by statute; 9 in at least
two of them, there have been judicial pronouncements that
no tenure exists. 10 In the states carved out of the Northwest
Territory, the existence of tenure may be made to depend on
the dominion over that territory after the Revolution, in the
absence of positive legislation; if it was really owned by Virginia
until her cession to the United States in 1784,11 then the
Virginia statute of 1779,12 abolishing tenure, applied there. 13
The history of legislation in the states east of the Mississippi
river makes it a simple matter to determine the existence of
tenure in those states.
West of the Mississippi river, there is more difficulty.
Missouri was a part of the Louisiana Purchase which had
various systems of law at various times. The law of the Indians
was merely tribal, not territorial, and has not therefore affected
the history of our land law. Indian grants of land were
entitled to no recognition in courts applying a territorial system
a good discussion of tenure in the United States, see 1 Washburn, Real
Property (5th ed.) p. 67. Cf. 3 Osgood, American Colonies, p. 510.
8. Gray, Perpetuities (3d ed.) § 22. See De Lancey v. Piepgras
(1893) 138 N. Y. 26, 40.
9. Gray, Perpetuities (3d ed.) § 23.
10. Matthews v. Ward (1839) 10 G. & J. (Md.) 443, 451 (dictum);
Wallace v. IHarmstead (1863) 44 Pa. 492 (dictum). The latter is opposed
to Ingersoll v. Sergeant (1836) 1 Whart. 337. See also Foulke, Perpetu-
ities, p. 44. In Gibbons v. Gibbons (1807) Charlton (Ga.) 113, counsel
argued and the court agreed that "the Revolution destroyed the ideas
attached to an estate in fee simple. * * * The term fee, as it imports a
subjection to some superior in a feudal acceptation, is unknown to the
constitution and laws of the American people. * * * A man seized of
lands * * * in the state of Georgia (and every other state in the Union)
is seized thereof absolutely in his own demesne, and the allodial estate
or property remains in himself." But tenure is now declared to ' xist in
Georgia by statute. Georgia Code of 1911, § 3623.
11. The Northwest Territory was also claimed by Connecticut,
Massachusetts, and New York. Hinsdale, Old Northwest, c. XI.
12. Virginia Statutes of 1779, c. 13.
13. Professor Gray holds this view. Perpetuities (3d ed.) § 23.
Cf. Penny v. Little (1841) 4 I1. 301.
8 LAW SERIES, MISSOURI BULLETIN
of law. 1 4  France acquired the territory west of the Mississippi
river during the latter part of the seventeenth century, and
the French law was made to prevail by the edict of Louis XIV
in 1664, extending the "Custom of Paris" to his American
possessions.' 5 The French law at that time included a well-
defined system of land tenure"8 which was established in parts
of America,' 7 and which must have obtained, at least in legal
theory, in the Louisiana territory. In 1762, the territory was
ceded by France to Spain. 1 8  In 1769, Governor O'Reilly
proclaimed the Spanish law to be in force19 and thereafter the
so-called "law of the Indies" was applied.2 0
The Spanish law had not replaced the French law in the
interval between 1762 and 1769, for mere cession does not
work a change of law; 21 but the Spanish crown must have
succeeded the French crown as paramount lord in 1762.22
Whether, in the Spanish law which prevailed after 1769, the
crown was conceived to be overlord, is more doubtful. In
mediaeval times, there was a system of land tenure in Spanish
law, 23 which persisted until the beginning of the nineteenth
century, and it seems probable that it was extended to America
14. Johnson v. M'Intosh (1823) 8 Wheaton 543. Cf. Cherokee
Nation v. Georgi'a (1831) 5 Peters 1.
15. The conqueror's law does not prevail in conquered territory by
reason of conquest alone. Blankard v. Galdy (1693) 2 Salkeld 411.
16. Brissaud, History of French Private Law, § 60.
17. In Canada, the French seignorial system of land tenure got a
firm foothold. Munro, Seignorial System in Canada, p. 31 et seq. It
was finally abolished in 1854. See 2 Canada and Its Provinces, p. 590.
It seems that Louisiana was at one time subordinate to the government
of "New France" or Canada. 1 Houck, History of Missouri, p. 269.
18. The Spanish did not actually take possession of the territory
until 1769, tho the French asserted no authority after 1762. This
period, 1762 to 1769, is therefore spoken of as an interregnum in Wright v.
Thomas (1837) 4 Mo. 577. See also lill v. Wright (1833) 3 Mo. 243,
19. 2 Fortier, History of Louisiana, p. 6; 2 Houck, History of
Missouri, p. 196. But see report of commissioners on Land Claims In
Missouri, American State Papers, V Public Lands, p. 707.
20. Walton, Civil Law in Spain and Spanish-America, p. 520.
21. Commonwealth v. Chapman (1848) 13 Metcalf (Mass.) 68.
22. While there is little evidence of actual Spanish occupation of
Upper Louisiana between 1762 and 1769, there can be no question of
Spanish sovereignty during that period. See Wright v. Thomas (1837) 4
Mo. 577.
23. .2 Falcon, Derecho Civil Espanol (4th ed.) pp. 45, 50 et seg.;
1 White, New Recopilacion, pp. 85, 342.
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and became a part of the-"law of the Indies." 24  But in
Louisiana the opinion seems to be that lands have always been
allodial.25 The question is now only of historical interest, and
the later history of landholding in what was Louisiana territory
does not depend upon it in any way.
Louisiana was ceded by Spain to France in 1800 and by
France to the United States in 1803. But the Spanish law
continued to prevail in Louisiana after both cessions. There
were several divisions of the territory after 1803;26 but the
Spanish law continued to prevail in what is now Missouri until
1816, when by act of the territorial legislature it was superseded
by "the common law of England, which is of a general nature,
and all statutes made by the British Parliament in aid of or to
supply the defects of the said common law, made prior to the
fourth year of James the first, and of a general nature and not
24. Blackmar, Spanish Colonization in the Southwest, Johns
Hopkins University Studies in History and Political Science (8th series)
p. 59. The following provision of the "law of the Indies" as promulgated in
1535 would seem to indicate tenure of land: "Let the lands be distributed
reasonably among the discoverers and colonists, and their descendants,
who may remain in the country, and let them not be able to sell them
either to the church or to a monastery or to any other ecclesiastical
person, under pain of the lands reverting to the king and being conferred
upon other persons." Leyes de Indias, lib. 4, tit. 12, ley 10. In writing
of certain Spanish grants in America, White says, "Whether these grants
were absolute or conditional, in the nature of fiefs, or merely for the
encouragement of settlement and cultivation, I have found no means
of ascertaining." New Recopilacion, p. 15. In the report of the congres-
sional commissioners on Land Claims in Missouri, it is said that "such
grants bear, in their terms, the character of vesting a fee simple in the
grantee." American State Papers, V Public Lands, p. 706.
25. In Xiques v. Bujac (1852) 7 La. Ann. 498, 504, the court said
that "in Louisiana, all titles to land were, and remain allodial, and not
feudal. The feudal law, and its usages, never had a place in this region,
under the Spanish government, and the jurisprudence of real property,
under the common law, cannot be applicable to land titles in this state."
26. From 1804 to 1805, Missouri (Louisiana) was a part of the terri-
tory of Indiana. In 1804, the Governor and Judges of Indiana Territory,
on whom Congress had conferred authority to legislate for Louisiana,
enacted that all deeds conveying "any estate of inheritance in fee simple"
and containing the words grant, bargain and sell, should be construed to
contain express covenants of seisin, of freedom from incumbrances and
of quiet enjoyment. See Laws of District of Louisiana 1804, p. 101.
This seems to be a legislative recognition of tenancy in fee simple. In
1805, the Territory of Louisiana was organized and in 1812 the Territory
of Missouri was organized.
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local to that kingdom. ' ' 27 If a tenure prevailed before 1800,
then it continued to prevail after the cessions of 1800 and
1803. It is an interesting academic question whether the
federal or the territorial government was the successor of the
French government, if tenure prevailed.2" The effect of the
adoption of the common law, if a system of tenure previously
existed, must have been to continue the existing system with
the single modification of Quia Emptoress9 which abolished
subinfeudation. If no tenure existed previously then it must
have been introduced with the common law: ° it was an es-
sential part of the common law system; and as is shown by the
history of land ownership in the American colonies, it is not
so inconsistent with modern conditions in Missouri as to
have been excluded by implication when the common law
was adopted. So it seems that socage31 tenure must have
existed in Missouri since 1816, for there has been no legislation
on the subject since that date. 32
27. 1 Missouri Territorial Laws, p. 436. This statute was re-
enacted in the revision of 1825. Revised Statutes 1825, p. 491.
28. Perhaps the question is more accurately stated as follows:
if tenure prevailed, did the federal government abdicate its position as
paramount lord in favor of the territorial government when it created the
latter? Another question of nicety may arise: if the federal government
continued to be overlord, was this position surrendered to the state on
its admission into the Union? It is submitted that this must have been
the result. But see 1 Cooley, Blackstone's Commentaries (3d ed.) p.
380, note. But the federal government may have continued to be para-
mount lord of the public lands to which it kept the title.
29. (1290) 18 Edw. I, c. 1. Whether De Donis was included in
the body of English law adopted in 1816, see 1 Law Series, Missouri
Bulletin, p. 6.
30. Gray, Perpetuities (3d ed.) § 23. Professor Gray expresses a
doubt as to the validity of the statute establishing the common law in
the Northwest Territory. See 1 Chase's (Ohio) Statutes, p. 190, note.
But it seems that Congress had given to the legislature of the Territory of
Missouri plenary legislative power. 1 Missouri Territorial Laws, p. 9.
31. Tho military tenure was not completely abolished in England
until 1660, and the Missouri statute adopted the English law as of 1606,
the tenure in Louisiana must have been socage for while no fixed service
was owed by the tenant, the society of the time offered no basis for military
tenure. See ante, p. 4.
32. It should be noted that in some of the states carved out of the
Louisiana Purchase, there have been legislative declarations that tenure
does not exist. In Minnesota, a part of which was formerly in Louisiana,
the constitution declares all land to be allodial. Art. I, § 15. So in
Arkansas. Art. II, § 28. In Iowa, the existence of tenure may be made to
depend on early Michigan legislation. Gray, Perpetuities (3d. ed.)
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The conclusion that land in Missouri is not owned abso-
lutely but is held by the owner in fee simple as tenant of the
state which must be regarded as paramount owner, may be
surprising only because of its being unfamiliar. The courts
and the lawyers seem to have assumed that tenure did not find
its way into Missouri law, without much discussion of the sub-
ject. Some isolated references may be found, as in Frame v.
Humphreys,38 where the court said that "the last vestige of the
system of feudal tenures was swept from our statute book" by
an amendment of the statute abolishing estates tail.14  But the
subject has had little attention in Missouri decisions, tho it
must be familiar to every student of real property law. Indeed,
the term estate in itself connotes a holding of land and for this
reason it is not applied to personal property which is owned
and not held. So, fee simple must refer to the character of a
tenancy and not to the extent of real ownership.
The existence of tenure in Missouri presents questions of
more than historical interest. The solution of some practical
problems in the law of future interests may depend upon it.
The more burdensome incidents of tenure certainly do not
exist, 35 but it is quite thinkable that some of the ancient inci-
dents of tenure still obtain. Fealty was one of the chief of
these-a formal recognition of allegiance to the crown; tho in
modern times every citizen is coXnceived to owe allegiance to
the state irrespective of land tenure, it may be that fealty is
not altogether obsolete.3 6  Estheat, tho usually spoken of as
an incident of tenure, 37 is really a perquisite of tenure-if a
§ 23. It seems that no tenure exists in Louisiana. Xiques v. Bujac (1852)
7 La. Ann. 498, 504.
33. (1901) 164 Mo. 336.
34. See I Law Series, Missouri Bulletin, p. 17.
35. Story, Constitution of the United States (3d ed.) p. 119.
It should be noted that the power of eminent domain is in no sense
dependent on tenure; it is an attribute of sovereignty, not of ownership.
1 Lewis, Eminent Domain (2d ed.) § 3; Nichols, Eminent Domain, § 8.
36. In De Lancey v. Piepgras (1893) 138 N. Y. 26, 39, the obligation
of fealty was recognized in a grant made in 1763. On the New York
manor lands, see 1 Reeves, Real Property, § 289, note. In Matthews v.
Ward (1839) 10 Gill & J. (Md.) 443, the court said that after the Revolu-
tion "the oath of allegiance to the State superseded the incidents of fealty."
37. 1 Washburn, Real Property (5th ed.) p. 51. It is spoken of as
a right of seignory in Leake, Property in Land (2d ed.) p. 20.
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tenant's heirs fail by reason of either the extinction or cor-
ruption of his blood, the tenure ends and the land escheats to
the lord. It would seem that escheat is possible in Missouri
to day where a tenant's heirs fail by reason of the extinction of
his blood ;18 but the statute in force since 181439 provides for
a statutory escheat which renders it unnecessary to resort to this
consequence of tenure.
So much for the incidents of present day tenure. The
existence of tenure may have some effect on the validity of
possibilities of reverter. There is high authority4 ° for the
position that such interests were abolished by Quia Emptores41
which put an end to subinfeudation. Unless tenure prevails,
that venerable statute is no part of Missouri law and the
question of the validity of possibilities of reverter cannot arise
in Missouri. It seems that the Missouri court has not addressed
itself to this question. 4 2
The tenure heretofore spoken of is not to be confused with
the "imperfect" tenure which exists between the owner of
a particular estate and the owner of the reversion which follows
it. When a tenant in fee simple conveys to another in fee tail, 4
or for life, or for years,44 there is considered to exist a modified
38. Failure of heirs for corruption of blood is no longer possible in
the United States. Missouri Constitution of 1875, Art. I, § 13. See
Reeves, Real Property, § 998.
39. See Geyer's Digest, p. 63. The statute is now Revised Statutes
1909, § 6256. It may be that a principle analogous to escheat would
confer title on the state as ultimus heres apart from tenure and statute.
Matthews v. Ward (1839) 10 Gill & J. (Md.) 443; Reeves, Real Property,
§ 290. Such a principle confers on the state the title to bona vacantia.
In the leading case of Burgess v. Wheate (1759) 1 Eden 177, it was
held that there is no escheat of an equitable fee. The soundness of such
a decision at the present day might be made to depend on the existence
of tenure. See Gray, Perpetuities (3d ed.) § 204, note; Challis, Real
Property (3d ed.) p. 38.
40. Gray, Perpetuities (3d ed.) § 31. See also Tiffany, Real Prop-
erty, § 81.
41. (1290) 18 Edw. I, c. 1.
42. The Missouri court has shown little disposition to distinguish
between determinable, base and qualified fees. Gaven v. Allen (1889)
100 Mo. 293, criticised in 17 Harvard Law Review 303. Strictly, a
possibility of reverter can exist only with a determinable fee. Tiffany,
Real Property, § 81.
43. On the effect of such a conveyance under the Missouri Statutes,
see I Law Series, Missouri Bulletin, p. 24 et seq.
44. Strictly speaking, there was probably no estate for years at
common law and therefore no tenure in such case. Challis, Real Property
LAND TENURE AND CONVEYANCES IN MISSOURI
species of tenure which may involve either services by the tenant
or the payment of a rent. Quia Emptores abolished subinfeuda-
tion only where a fee simple was passed. This tenure is the
basis for the implication of a condition against disclaimer of the
landlord's title.45 It was also the basis for the forfeiture
caused by an attempt of a tenant for life or years to convey a fee
simple by a feoffment, fine or recovery. It is possible that such
forfeiture may still occur in Missouri.4
6
It would seem, therefore, that all land in Missouri is held
instead of owned, the state being paramount lord. This con-
ception is of some practical importance in determining the
basis for escheat, the status of possibilities of reverter, and the
effect of conveyances by life tenants. It is more important
however in studying the manner in which present day con-
veyances operate to pass title and the extent to which such con-
veyances are restricted in the creation and transfer of future
interests in land.
III METHODS OF CONVEYANCE
Under the Spanish law which prevailed in Missouri until
1816, 47 land could be conveyed by a simple agreement which
was not required to be in writing and which was effective
without any entry on the land. 48  As early as 1804, a statute
(3d ed.) p. 65. Strictly, also, there is no remainder or reversion after a
term for years-the owner of the freehold being seised subject to the
term; "leasehold tenure" is, however, an accepted phrase. Ibid., p. 99.
45. 1 Law Series, Missouri Bulletin, p. 3; Tiffany, Real Property,
§ 52; Leake, Property in Land (2d ed.) p. 40.
46. In Foote v. Sanders (1880) 72 Mo. 616, a life tenant's deed
purporting to pass a fee simple was held to have passed simply the life
estate. The question of forfeiture was not raised, and the deed probably
operated as a bargain and sale so that a forfeiture was impossible. On
forfeiture by a life tenant, see Redfern v. Middleton (1839) 1 Rice (S. C.)
459; Stump v. Findlay (1828) 2 Rawle 168; 1 Washburn, Real Property
(6th ed.) §§ 229-233; Reeves, Real Property, § 540.
47. 1 Missouri Territorial Laws, p. 436.
48. Mitchell v. Tuckers (1846) 10 Mo. 260; Allen v. Moss (1858) 27
Mo. 354; Long v. Stapp (1872) 49 Mo. 506; Langlois v. Crawford (1875) 59
Mo. 456. For the regulations governing Spanish grants, see Geyer's
Digest, p. 438 et seq. It seems that in the later years of Spanish control,
at least after 1798, a formal conveyance was necessary. The regulations
speak of an "acknowledgment of conveyance of land" and inserting "in
the deed the metes and bounds." Geyer's Digest, p. 443. For a history
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was enacted requiring a record of "all deeds and conveyances, ' 49
but such record was construed to have been required only for
the protection of subsequent purchasers and mortgagees.5 0 In
1816, the adoption of the common law and appropriate statutes
of the British Parliament enacted prior to the fourth year of
James I, resulted in the abolition of the informal Spanish
methods of conveying land and the substitution of the more
formal English methods in vogue in 1606.51 For an under-
standing of the law of conveyancing in Missouri after 1816, it
is therefore necessary to determine what methods of conveyance
were known to the common law as it was modified by legisla-
tion prior to 1606.
At common law the most important method of conveying
an estate of freehold lying in possession was livery of seisin.
No writing was necessary, tho from early times the livery of
seisin was usually evidenced by a deed.52  The whole trans-
action, the livery of seisin and the oral or written evidence of
its intended nature, was called a feoffment.5 3 This simple act
of handing over the land by one to another, tho it grew out of
the formal, feudal ceremony of investiture,5 4 served much the
same function as the delivery of a chattel. It was obviously
impossible to convey an estate of freehold not lying in pos-
of St. Louis land titles, see 1 Scharf, History of St. Louis, p. 316. See
also the report of the congressional commissioners on Land Claims in
Missouri, American State Papers, V Public Lands, p. 702 et seq.
49. 1 Missouri Territorial Laws, p. 47.
50. Allen v. Moss (1858) 27 Mo. 354.
51. The statute of 1816 adopted the common law and statutes "not
contrary to the laws of this territory." This should be interpreted so as
to make the adoption effective, and it should therefore be held that the
common law of conveyancing entirely superseded the Spanish law. It is
believed that this is the opinion prevailing at the bar. In Reaume v.
Chambers (1855) 22 Mo. 36, 53, the court said, "after the introduction
of the common law, the Spanish law no longer had any existence here."
But see Lindell v. McNair (1836) 4 Mo. 380. Cf. State ex rel. v. Withrow
(1895) 133 Mo. 500.
52. Poe v. Domec (1871) 48 Mo. 441. A deed was necessary to
a feoffment to a corporation aggregate at common law. Challis, Real
Property (3d ed.) p. 403.
53. Technically, only a fee simple could be conveyed by feoffment;
when a fee tail was conveyed by the same process, it was called a gift;
when a life estate was conveyed, a lease.
54. Digby, History of Law of Real Property (5th ed.) p. 146; 2
Pollock & Maitland, History of English Law (2d ed.) p. 85.
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session by livery of seisin to which an entry on the land was
essential; reversions and remainders were therefore conveyed
by a writing under seal, called a deed, which operated as a
grant. For a grant of a reversion or a remainder, attornment
by the tenant in possession was necessary. Between persons
not strangers to the land, a conveyance could be by surrender
or release-the former involving nothing but the act of giving
up the land with intent to pass the particular estate held, to
one whose estate was such as to absorb the particular estate by
merger; the release was simply a grant of a reversion or re-
mainder to one who had a particular estate already, and it
might or might not have been followed by a merger. Fines
and recoveries were also used to pass freehold interests in land,
both being collusive suits employed chiefly to bar entails. 5
A freehold could also be passed by exchange for another free-
hold, for which a parol agreement without livery of seisin was
sulfficient. 5
An estate of less than freehold, lying in possession, was
created and transferred at common law by parol agreement
followed by entry. A future estate for years could be conveyed
only by deed.
No consideration was required for a conveyance at common
law.5" But with the growth of equity jurisdiction it became
necessary to rebut resulting uses and this could be accomplished
by either a consideration in fact, or a recital of consideration,
or a declaration of the use.
The statute of uses58 of 1536 left all of the common law
methods unchanged and introduced two new methods of con-
veyance-bargain and sale and covenant to stand seised.
These were not primarily new methods of conveying legal titles,
55. See 3 Gray, Cases on Property (2d ed.) p. 191. Fines and
recoveries were abolished in England in 1834. 3 and 4 William IV, c. 74.
56. See the valuable note on Exchange in 3 Gray, Cases on Property
(2d ed.) p. 248.
57. In Jackson v. Alexander (1808) 3 Johns. 484, Kent, C. J., said
that "the general and the better opinion is, that the notion of a considera-
tion first came from the court of equity." See Springs v. Hanks (1844)
5 Ired. Law (N. C.) 30; 3 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (3d ed.) § 981.
58. 27 Henry VIII, c. 10.
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but methods of raising a use to be executed by the statute. For
a bargain and sale of a freehold, the statute of enrolments,5 9
also enacted in 1536, required a writing indented, sealed and
enrolled. For a covenant to stand seised, the requirement of
a writing under seal was the result of judicial decision.60
An actual consideration was required to raise a use in a bargain
and sale;6 1 a covenant to stand seised had to be supported by
a good consideration, i.e., a relationship by blood or marriage. 62
Reversions and remainders could be conveyed by bargain and
sale without the necessity of attornment.63
Such, then, were the methods of conveyance established in
Missouri by the adoption of the common law and appropriate
statutes of the British parliament in 1816. The statutes of De
Donis," of Quia Emptores,65 and of uses66 were included. But
the English statute of enrolments was probably never a part of
Missouri law, for it required an enrolment in an English court."
Nor was the English statute of frauds 68 enacted in 1676 included;
but a very similar statute of frauds was enacted immediately,
requiring every conveyance of any interest in land to be in
59. 27 Henry VIII, c. 16. The statute of enrolments was evaded
by the device of lease and release-the lease operating by way of bargain
and sale to which the statute had no application if it was less than a free-
hold, the release operating as a common law method of conveying the
future estate to the holder of a particular estate. Conveyances by lease
and release have seldom, if ever, been employed in the United States.
60. Callard v. Callard (1593) Moore 687.
61. Modernly, a recital of consideration is conclusive as to the
existence of a consideration for the purpose of raising a use. See Draper
v. Shoot (1857) 25 Mo. 197; Tiffany, Real Property, § 384.
62. This was the consequence of the desire of men to establish their
families. See Bacon, Uses, 13, 14.
63. Edward Fox's Case (1610) 8 Co. 93b.
64. 1 Law Series, Missouri Bulletin, p. 6.
65. Vide ante, p. 8.
66. A statute of uses, similar to the English statute of 1536, was re-
enacted in Missouri in 1825. Revised Statutes 1825, p. 215. Now
Revised Statutes 1909, § 2867. In the statute of 1804, the words "grant,
bargain and sale" were given the effect of implying covenants. See Laws
of Louisiana 1804, p. 101. "Bargain and sell" must be given their vulgar
meaning in this statute, for it can hardly be contended that a statute of
uses was in force in 1804.
67. Givan v. Doe (1844) 7 Black. (Ind.) 210; Gray, Perpetuities
(2d ed.) § 67, note; Tiffany, Real Property,, § 376.
68. 29 Car. II, c. 3.
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writing.6 9 In McCabe v. Hunter,70 it seems to have been held
that this statute required all conveyances to be by deed, but
it is difficult to justify such a decision. 7' The statute of con-
veyances in 1845 required "every conveyance in fee, or of a
freehold estate" to be subscribed and sealed. 72 The statute of
1865 required "all deeds or other conveyances of lands, or of
any estate or interest therein," to be subscribed and sealed
and acknowledged. 73 This statute has persisted,74 except that
in 1893 seals were made unnecessary in all conveyances.75 It
is to be noted that the methods introduced in 1816 were not
changed by this legislation, but were required to be evidenced
in a certain way, viz., by deed.
In 1865, a new method of conveyance was introduced by
the enactment that "conveyances of lands or of any estate or
interest therein may be made by deed * * * without any
other act or ceremony whatever."17 6 The courts seem to have
assumed that any freehold lying in possession or out of posses-
sion might be so conveyed prior to this statute.7 7  In Tapley
v. Ogle,7 8 it was said obiter that this statute negatived a con-
veyance in any other manner, but it is believed that so radical
a change of the law should not be based on implication. It
would seem that the statute simply introduced a new method of
69. 1 Missouri Territorial Laws, p. 439. In Chapman v. Templeton
(1873) 53 Mo. 463, the court said that "since the introduction of the
common law into this state, conveyances of land cannot be made simply
by parol." This, it should have been stated, is only true because of the
Missouri statute of frauds. The inchoate right of an adverse possessor
may be transferred to another adverse possessor without a writing.
Crispen v. Hannavan (1872) 50 Mo. 536.
70. (1842) 7 Mo. 355. Cf. Moss v. Anderson (1841) 7 Mo. 337;
Long v. Stapp (1872) 49 Mo. 506.
71. Fry v. Phillips (1772) 5 Burrows 2827, which was cited by the
court, is no authority for its decision. The statement in 1 Taylor, Land-
lord and Tenant (9th ed.) § 34 is clearly erroneous.
72. Revised Statutes 1845, c. 32, § 15.
73. Revised Statutes 1865, c. 109, § 7.
74. Revised Statutes 1909, § 2792.
75. Laws of 1893, p. 117. Now Revised Statutes 1909, § 2773.
76. Revised Statutes 1865, c. 109, § 1.
77. Perry v. Price (1825) 1 Mo. 553. In Harrington v. Fortner
(1874) 58 Mo. 468, the court said that an unacknowledged deed was
"good as a common law deed."
78. (1901) 162 Mo. 190.
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conveyance, viz., statutory grant, 79 and made all interests in
land alienable.'
This survey of the legislation concerning conveyances will
perhaps suffice to show how it is possible to convey land in
Missouri and how each method of conveyance operates to pass
the title. It now remains to study the present position in the
law of each of the methods outlined, and the extent to which
each is employed by conveyancers.
1. Feoffment. It would seem that livery of seisin, if
evidenced by some writing which will satisfy the statute of
frauds, is still effectual tho it is probably entirely obsolete.
81
While it has been made unnecessary, livery of seisin has not
been abolished in Missouri.82 In Perry v. Price,83 it was held
that a deed might operate as a feoffment without livery of
seisin, the function of which was performed by the record.
84
While a writing is essential, it seems that no consideration in
fact or recital is necessary,8 but there must be a rebuttal of
a resulting use. The common law restrictions on feoffment
still obtain-the feoffor cannot convey to himself, nor can he
make his heir a purchaser.8 6 But an estate may be made to
commence in futuro as a result of the statutory provision that
estates of freehold "may be made to commence in future by
deed, in like manner as by will;" ' 7 and the statute would seem
79. In Poe v. Domec (1871) 48 Mo. 441, the court said, "An ordinary
conveyance, under our statute, is a feoffment as well as bargain and sale."
It is submitted that this is inaccurate.
80. Including contingent remainders, Godman v. Simmons (1893)
113 Mo. 122; Summet v. Realty Co. (1907) 208 Mo. 501: and possibly
rights of entry for condition broken, 5 Law Series, Missouri Bulletin, p. 15.
81. Revised Statutes 1909, § 2781, refers to estates made or created
by livery and seisin only, thereby recognizing the efficacy of livery of
seisin. There is an instance of livery of seisin in New York as late as 1827.
McGregor v. Comstock (1858) 17 N. Y. 162, 171. In England, an infant
tenant in gavelkind is still obliged to convey by feoffment. Digby,
History of the Law of Real Property (5th ed.) p. 412, note; Challis, Real
Property (3d ed.) p. 402.
82. It has been abolished in some states by statute. Stimson,
American Statute Law, § 1470.
83. (1825) 1 Mo. 553.
84. See Chambers v. Chambers (1909) 227 Mo. 262.
85. See Green v. Thomas (1834) 11 Maine 318; Brewster, Convey-
ance by Deed, p. 63 et seq.
86. Leake, Property in Land (2d ed.) p. 37.
87. Revised Statutes 1845, c. 32, § 9. Now Revised Statutes 1909,
§ 2876. See O'Day v. Meadows (1905) 194 Mo. 588, 621 et seq.; Aldridge
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to authorize also the creation by feoffment of future interests
which do not take effect as remainders, interests similar to
shifting uses.' There would seem to be nothing to prevent a
feoffment from having a tortious operation-an attempt by
a tenant for years or for life to convey a fee simple by deed of
feoffment may therefore occasion the forfeiture of his estate, 8
but to avoid this result every effort would be made to treat the
conveyance as operating by some method which could have no
tortious effect, such as statutory grant or bargain and sale.8 9
Feoffment may also be used in connection with uses-A may
enfeoff B and his heirs to the use of C and his heirs, and a court
of equity will force B to hold to the use of C without reference
to consideration; the statute of uses will then execute the use.
Where A enfeoffs B to his own use, there is no use for the statute
to execute. B really holds free of use.90
2. Grant. This is still the classical way of conveying
incorporeal hereditaments9" and future estates. The common
v. Aldridge (1907) 202 Mo. 565; Buxton v. Kroeger (1908) 219 Mo. 224,
256. It would seem that this statute did not make remainders and
executory devises convertible, tho such would seem to be the effect of the
court's statement in Buxton v. Kroeger that "it was not necessary that
there should be any estate created between the end of the life estate and
the vesting of the estate in remainder."
88. The question might have been raised in Utter v. Sidman (1902)
170 Mo. 284. Revised Statutes 1909, § 2870, provides that "every
conveyance of real estate shall pass all the estate of the grantor therein,
unless the intent to pass a less estate shall expressly appear, or be neces-
sarily implied in the terms of the grant." This provides the minimum
and not the maximum effect of a conveyance, and may not therefore
affect tortious feoffments.
89. In Foote v. Sanders (1880) 72 Mo. 616, it was held that a life
tenant's conveyance which purported to pass a fee simple, Foote v. Clark
(1890) 102 Mo. 394, was effectual to pass the life estate. No forfeiture
was contended for, and the case can be explained on the ground that the
deed operated by way of bargain and sale. Cf. Owen v. Switzer (1873)
51 Mo. 322.
The tortious operation of feoffnents was abolished in England in
1845 by 8 and 9 Vict., c. 106, § 4. On tortious feoffments in the United
States, see Washburn, Real Property (6th ed.) § 232. In several states,
statutes provide that no conveyance shall occasion forfeiture. Alabama
Code 1907, § 3405 is typical of such statutes.
90. Gray, Perpetuities (3d ed.) § 930, note. For apparent exceptions
io the rule that "a person cannot be seised to his own use when there is
not any other purpose to be served," see Challis, Real Property (3d ed.)
p. 390.
91. Desloge v. Pearce (1866) 38 Mo. 588.
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law requirement of a deed has been changed only in that a
seal is no longer necessary; the statute now provides for the
grant of reversions and remainders without attornment by
the tenant in possession."2 No consideration is required but
the resulting of a use must be rebutted. If the grantee already
has a vested estate in the land, or if he is in possession as tenant
at will or for years or for life, the grant is called a release.9"
3. Surrender. This common law method of conveying
to one who is not a stranger to the title may still be used by a
tenant for life or for years. It is required by statute to be
"by a deed or note in writing, signed by the party surrendering,
* * * or by operation of law. ' 94  A merger must result from
a surrender. No consideration is necessary.
4. Fines and Recoveries. These means of conveying have
probably never been resorted to in Missouri. The early
modification of estates tail95 made it unnecessary to resort to
them for the purpose for which they were most used, viz.,
docking the entail. But both fines and recoveries were known
in the American colonies, 96 and there is an instance of a fine in
92. Revised Statutes 1909, § 7925. The Missouri statute is modeled
on 4 Anne, c. 16, § 19 (1705). It was first enacted in 1845. Revised
Statutes 1845, c. 32, § 11.
93. Releases are usually listed as a separate class of conveyances,
but such classification seems unnecessary for the purposes of this article.
Releases may enure in four manner of ways: (a) to pass a right, as where
a disseisee releases to a disseisor; (b) to pass an estate, as where one joint
tenant releases to another; (c) by way of enlargement, as where a vested
remainder in fee is released to a life tenant-but this enlargement is really
the effect of merger following the grant; (d) by way of extinguishment, as
where a contingent remainderman releases to a reversioner. See Coke,
Littleton 267a, Butler's note; 1 Cooley, Blackstone's Commentaries
(3d ed.) p. 518; Miller v. Emans (1859) 19 N. Y. 384. The technical
language of a release differs from that of a grant in that the word release
should be used.
A partition is not a release. The cases upholding parol partitions
are anomalous. Bompart v. Roderman (1857) 25 Mo. 385; Le Bourgeoise
v. Blank (1880) 8 Mo. App. 434. But see Hazen v. Barnett (1872) 50
Mo. 506; Nave v. Smith (1888) 95 Mo. 586.
94. Revised Statutes 1909, § 2782. On surrender by operation of
law, see Kerr v. Clark (1853) 19 Mo. 132; Matthews v. Tobener (1866) 39
Mo. 115; Huling v. Roll (1890) 43 Mo. App. 234; Robertson v. Winslow
(1903) 99 Mo. App. 546.
95. The statute adopting the common law expressly provided that
"the doctrine of entails shall never be allowed." 1 Missouri Territorial
Laws, p. 436. See 1 Law Series, Missouri Bulletin, p. 6.
96. Reeves, Real Property, § 429. They are still recognized by
statute in Delaware. See 1 Stimson, American Statute Law, § 1473.
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New York as late as 1827.97 No Missouri statute has abolished
fines and recoveries. In Moreau v. Detchemendy,98 the court
said obiter that a fine was "a species of assurance never used or
known in this country." It is improbable that fines and
recoveries will ever be revived in Missouri. And it would
probably be held that modern procedure is not adapted to
employing them. 99 The former use of fines in conveying the
interests of married women, 1' ° tho it would have been conven-
ient before the Married Women's Act,' 0 1 would now be super-
fluous.
5. Exchange. This method of conveying land is possible
in Missouri, buthas probably never been used. It would have
to be evidenced by a deed covering both parcels exchanged,
and each parcel would be treated as consideration for the other.
The estates exchanged must be equal,10 2 and the word exchange
must be used.'0 3, The law annexes an actual warranty of the
title to each tract conveyed, with a condition of re-entry, 10 4
and it is for this reason that mutual deeds of bargain and sale
are always preferred.
6. Bargain and Sale. Probably most Missouri convey-
ances can be upheld as operating by way of bargain and sale.
Before the statutory grant was introduced,1 05 it was the method
commonly used. 10 6 A writing is necessary indicating an
intention of one person to stand seised to the use of another.
A consideration is necessary to raise the use, tho perhaps a
recital of consideration will serve.'0 7 When the use is raised
97. McGregor v. Comstock (1852) 17 N. Y. 162.
98. (1853) 18 Mo. 522.
99. For the procedure followed in fines and recoveries, see 5 Cruise,
Digest (4th ed.) tit. XXXVtand XXXVI. For the tortious effect of
recoveries, see Stump v. Findlay (18'28) 2 Rawle (Pa.) 167.
100. See Lindell v. McNair (1836),49Mo.i380; Christy v. Burch (1887)
25 Fla. 942, 2 So. 258; Hitz v. Jenks (1887) 123 U. S. 297.
101. Enacted in Laws of 1875, p. 61. Now Revised Statutes 1909,
§ 8309.
102. Long v. Fuller (1866) 21 Wis. 121; Windsor"v. Collinson (1898)
32.Ore. 297, 52 Pac. 26.
103. Hartwell v. DeVault (1896) 159 Ill. 325.
104. Gamblelv. McClure (1871) 69 Pa. 282.
105. Revised Statutes 1865, c. 109, § 1.
106. Farrar v. Christy (1857) 24 Mo. 453.
107. See Draper v. Shoot (1857) 25 Mo. 197, 202, where the court
held that "the non-payment of the nominal consideration cannot be
3
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the statute immediately executes it, tho the statute does not
execute a use upon a use. For this latter reason it becomes
very important to determine whether a conveyance is a feoff-
ment or a bargain and sale: if A enfeoffs B to the use of C, the
statute executes the use in C; but if A bargains and sells to
B to the use of C, the statute executes a use in B but the use
in C remains unexecuted and C's interest is only equitable. 10 8
A conveyance by bargain and sale cannot possibly have a
tortious operation. It can be employed only by one who has
the seisin, and cannot therefore be used for transferring terms
for years, tho it may be used for creating them. 10 9 Reversions
and remainders may be conveyed by bargain and sale. The
use may be made to spring out of the bargainor at any future
time-thus A may agree to stand seised to the use of B from
and after a future date. And the use may be made to shift
from the bargainee at any future time, the new use taking
effect in substitution for the old. Shifting and springing uses
are executed by the statute of uses and are therefore legal
interests immediately after their creation. 110  Whereas future
interests created by feoffment must take effect as remainders,
future interests created by bargain and sale may take effect
immediately after or even tho they lap over, preceding estates.
But this is to be modified by the rule that any interest which is
capable of taking effect as a remainder cannot take effect as a
springing or shifting use.1 1 The possibility of shifting and
shown to defeat a deed." This language is broad enough to cover both
deeds of feoffment and deeds of bargain and sale. See Tiffany, Real
Property, § 384. This may rest on the principle of estoppel. See Challis,
Real Property (3d ed.) p. 420.
108. This distinction was involved in Green v. Sutton (1872) 50
Mo. 186. It is of great practical-importance in determining the applica-
tion of the rule against perpetuities to contingent remainders. See Gray,
Perpetuities (3d ed.) § 325.
109. Slevin v. Brown (1862) 32 Mo. 176; Leake, Property In Land
(2d ed.) p. 92. Terms for years were ordinarily transferred by assign-
ment. Tiffany, Real Property, § 375.
110. The bargainor or feoffee or grantee to uses was formerly
conceived to have a possibility of seisin pending the vesting of a future
use. This was the celebrated doctrine of scintilla juris, now abandoned.
Williams, Real Property, (17th Int. ed.) 437.
111. Doe d. Planner v. Scudamore (1800) 2 B. & P. 289; Gray,
Perpetuities (3d ed.) § 918 et seq. But cf. Simonds v. Simonds (1908) 199
Mass. 552. The rule stated in the text had its origin in the judges' dislike
of uses,
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springing uses does not do away with remainders created by
bargain and sale, therefore, and as to contingent remainders
there is still the necessity of their fitting immediately on to the
particular estates. 1 1 2  In Missouri and several other states
an anomalous rule prevails, due to Chancellor Kent's mis-
conception,' 1 1 that after a fee simple with an expressed absolute
power of disposition, any limitation by way of springing or
shifting use is void."'
7. Covenant to Stand Seised. There is little difference
to-day between a bargain and sale and a covenant to stand
seised. The requirement of a seal for the latter has been
abolished by statute."' While a bargain and sale must be
supported by an actual consideration in fact or recital, a cove-
nant to stand seised may be supported by a good consideration,
i.e., by relationship of blood or marriage. The conveyance
in Aubuchon v. Bender" 6 was held to operate as a covenant to
stand seised, tho supported by the consideration of a release of
dower. The deed in Hutsell v. Crewse"7l seems to have been
upheld as a covenant to stand seised, tho it may have contained
a recital of actual consideration so as to have been a good
bargain and sale, and it was probably a good statutory grant.
The same interests may be created by covenant to stand seised
as by bargain and sale, and in most instances conveyances
even to near relatives are now so made as to be supportable
by way of bargain and sale. Covenants to stand seised are
therefore little used to-day.
8. Statutory Grant. Since 1865118 it has been possible
to convey "any estate or interest" in land by deed. The
112. It should here be noted that an equitable contingent remainder,
unexecuted by the statute, does not need the support of a particular
estate since the seisin is held by the trustee. Asiley v. Micklethwait (1880)
15 Ch. Div. 59.
113. Jackson v. Robbins (1819) 16 Johns. (N. Y.) 537.
114. Green v. Sutton (1872) 50 Mo. 186; Cornwell v. Orion (1894) 126
Mo. 355; Cornwell v. Wulff (1898) 148 Mo. 542; Jackson v. Littell (1908)
213 Mo. 598. Cf. Straat v. Uhrig (1874) 56 Mo. 482; Wommack v. Whit-
more (1874) 58 Mo. 448. See Tiffany, Real Property, § 140.
115. Laws of 1893, p. 117. Now Revised Statutes 1909, § 2773.
116. (1869) 44 Mo. 560.
117. (1896) 138 Mo. 1.
118. Revised Statutes 1865, c. 109, § 1. Now Revised Statutes 1909,
§ 2787.
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statute requires no consideration and it would seem that none
is necessary for this statutory grant. 119 The statute provides
only for the conveyance, not for the creation of interests in
land. It is to be read, however, in connection with the statute
which provides that "an estate of freehold or of inheritance
may be made to commence in future by deed in like manner
as by will." 1 0 and it would seem therefore that any future
interest creatable by will, i.e., a springing or shifting use, may
be created by deed operating as a statutory grant.1 2 1
9. Lease and Assignment. The foregoing methods of
conveyance are chiefly applicable to freeholds-but leaseholds
in possession may be exchanged or surrendered; they may be
created by bargain and sale or covenant to stand seised; they
may be assigned in writing or conveyed by statutory grant.
and leaseholds not in possession may be conveyed by common
law grant or by statutory grant, but not by bargain and sale
or covenant to stand seised. The informal lease permitted at
common law would seem to have fallen under the requirement
in the statute of 1865 that all "conveyances of lands or of any
estate or interest therein" be by deed. 122 But it does not
seem to have been so held.123 Any writing which satisfies
the statute of frauds 124 is now sufficient and was probably
sufficient before the statute abolishing seals. Terms for one
year or less may be created by mere oral agreement.' 2 5 Entry
119. In Cooper v. Newell (Mo., 1914) 172 S. W. 326, a voluntary
conveyance by a son to his mother was effectuated, tho the mother was
forced to hold for the benefit of the son. This result was proper if the
conveyance operated as a statutory grant, but if it operated as a covenant
to stand seised it would seem that the grantee should have held for her
own benefit.
120. Revised Statutes 1909, § 2876. First enacted in 1845. Re-
vised Statutes 1845, c. 32, § 9. The body of this statute was copied
from 10 and 11 William III, c. 16 enacted in 1699, but the provision in
question was not included in that statute.
121. See O'Day v. Meadows (1905) 194 Mo. 588, 621, et seq.; Buxton
v. Kroeger (1908) 219 Mo. 224, 256.
122. Revised Statutes 1865, c. 109, § 7.
123. Gay v. Im (1877) 3 Mo. App. 588, memo. Cf. Firman De
Loge's Admr. v. Hall (1862) 31 Mo. 473.
124. Now Revised Statutes 1909, §§ 2781, 2783.
125. Ray v. Blackman (1906) 120 Mo. App. 497. But see Gerhart
v. Weiter (1904) 108 Mo. App. 248. The inconsistency in the statutes,
Revised Statutes 1909, §§ 2781, 2783 and 7883, has led to many conflicting
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is still necessary and until entry the tenant has only an interesse
termini,126 which is not sufficient for him to maintain trespass.127
Whatever form the actual conveyance may take, therefore,
whether it is a quitclaim 128 or a conveyance which purports
to pass a good title, it would seem that it must operate by one
of the methods above described. If the parties intend to
employ a particular method and for any reason their convey-
ance by that method cannot be given validity as intended, we
have the salutary principle that their conveyance will if pos-
sible be effectuated by some other method. This is the well
known principle of Roe v. Tranmer."9  In most cases it will
make little difference which method is used, and now that
conveyance has been made so easy it is usually unimportant
to determine how a conveyance operates. But the analysis
made must indicate that no complete study of future interests
is possible without this survey of the operation of conveyances.
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statements concerning the validity of terms for one year or less, but it
would seem that leases for one year or less should occupy the same place
in Missouri law which leases for three years or less occupied under the
English statute of frauds, 29 Car. II, c. 3. It seems wholly illogical that
a lease for one year, to begin in futuro but within one year, should be
required to be in writing; for the contract is really performed when the
lease is executed since a vested estate is then put into the lessee. Shacklett
v. Cummins (Mo., 1914) 165 S. W. 1145; Austin v. Huntsville Coal &
Mining Co. (1880) 72 Mo. 535. Cf. L'Hussier v. Zallee (1856) 24 Mo. 13.
126. Austin v. Huntsville Coal & Mining Co. (1880) 72 Mo. 535.
Cf. L'Hussier v. Zallee (1856) 24 Mo. 13; Taylor, Landlord & Tenant
(9th ed.) §§ 15, 68; Tiffany, Landlord & Tenant, § 37.
127. Deland v. Vanstone (1887) 26 Mo. App. 297.
128. For the ancient office of the quitclaim, see 2 Pollock and
Maitland, History of English Law (2d ed.) p. 91. The modern quitclaim
probably had its origin in the common law release. See 2 Reeves, Real
Property, § 1056; Tiffany, Real Property, § 377. But a quitclaim deed
to-day "is not a mere release. It has the effect of completely transferring
whatever title the grantor had to the persons named as grantees." Chew
v. Kellar (1902) 171 Mo. 215. On the position of the grantee in a quit-
claim deed, see Starr v. Bartz (1908) 219 Mo. 47.
129. (1757) 2 Wils. 75. See Hunt v. Hunt (1833) 14 Pick. (Mass.)
374, cited with approval in Wilson v. Albert (1886) 89 Mo. 537.
130. The writer has been ably assisted by John M. Linger, Esq.,
in the preparation of this article.
